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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmABSTRACT 
Germany recently introduced several unification-related tax measures for financing 
resource transfers to support the eastern economy.  This paper assesses the generational 
stance of postunification German fiscal policy and estimates the burden of unification- 
related fiscal measures on West German generations.  It finds that postunification German 
fiscal policy is, generationally speaking, imbalanced: Future generations will bear 22 
percent larger lifetime net tax burdens than current newborn German generations.  Most of 
the burden of the tax increases falls on young and working-age generations.  Additional 
tax increases or spending reductions are required to produce a generationally balanced 
fiscal policy. 
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The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 initiated the process of  unifying the very 
different economies of East and West Germany. Initial euphoria over unification has been 
replaced by apprehension about the likely costs of financing the eastern region's transition. 
So far, the transition has necessitated large annual resource transfers -- exceeding 5 
percent of western GDP -- to support economically dislocated eastern residents and to 
improve the eastern public infrastructure and industrial base.  These transfers, which are 
expected to continue for a number of years, will surely impose sizable additional burdens 
on living and future German generations, especially on those residing in the West.  Recent 
legislation has enacted various tax measures, including a surcharge on income taxes, to 
help defray the costs of these transfers.' 
This paper evaluates the generational stance of postunification German fiscal 
policy and assesses how the burden of unification is being spread across different West 
German generations. The estimation uses the technique of generational accounting 
(Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff [  199  1, 19921). It finds that, from a generational 
perspective, postunification German fiscal policy is imbalanced. The paper assesses the 
sensitivity of the imbalance to alternative assumptions regarding 1) future interest and 
growth rates and 2) the number of years for which the income tax surcharge is kept in 
place.  It indicates the extent of additional spending, benefit cuts, or tax increases that 
See the Federal Consolidation Program (Gesetz zur Umsetzung des  faderalen 
Konsolidierungsprogramms) of July 6, 1993. Most of the measures are permanent; the income tax 
surcharge is, however, expected to continue only as long as is deemed necessary to complete the process of 
transition. 
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compares German and U.S.  fiscal polices from a generational perspective. 
The main results of the paper are that, under the postunification fiscal policies, 
unborn German generations face lifetime net tax payments that are 22 percent larger than 
those of current newborn generations, after adjusting for economic growth.  Furthermore, 
most of the burden of unification is borne by young and middle-aged western residents -- 
those age 55 or less.  The introduction and maintenance of the income tax surcharge 
reduces but does not eliminate the imbalance in German fiscal policy.  Income taxes need 
to be increased permanently by another 9 percent, on average, to achieve a balanced fiscal 
policy.  Finally, the paper finds that German fiscal policy is not as severely imbalanced as 
that of the United States under current policy projections. 
The paper continues in  section 11 with a description of the macroeconomic aspects 
of unification. Section 111 briefly describes the method of generational accounting. 
Section IV contains a description of the data used in the analysis.  Section V describes the 
findings and their sensitivity to alternative assumptions and policy scenarios. Section VI 
compares baseline generational accounts for Germany and the United States, and section 
VII summarizes and concludes the paper. 
11.  Macroeconomic Aspects of unification2 
Territorially, East Germany is 44 percent as large as West Germany; in terms of 
population, it is 24 percent as large.  As of  1990, however, East Germany's capital stock 
'~roader  analysis of  the macroeconomic consequences of  German unification  is found in Lipschitz and 
McDonald (1990), Sinn and Sinn (1992) and Raffelhiischen (1994). 
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due to the obsolete technology embodied in the East German capital stock. Hence, 
immediately after the German economic, monetary, and social union (GEMSU) in July 
1990, eastern GDP per capita amounted to only 26.3 percent of the western figure. 
GEMSU replaced the East German mark (M) with the deutsche mark (DM), lifted 
all economic barriers, and extended the western social insurance and legal systems to 
cover eastern residents.  One common market was established, ending all restrictions on 
capital flows and leaving people free to relocate.  On October 3, 1990, the former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) joined West Germany as five new states in the German 
federal structure. 
Before unification, East German productivity suffered because of a highly distorted 
allocation of resources. Factor prices did not reflect capital and labor scarcities, 
commodity prices did not signal market demands, and international trade was mostly 
restricted to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Moreover, most of 
the physical capital was outdated. After unification, central planning had to be replaced by 
a framework involving competitive markets.  In introducing reforms, Germany chose a 
"big bang" approach. 
Prior to GEMSU, eastern labor productivity and per capita output amounted to 
roughly one-third of the western levels.  The training of the eastern labor force, however, 
was apparently similar to that of the West.  Hence, the gap in labor productivity was 
mainly due to scarcity of capital.  Indeed, according to Sinn and Sinn (1992), roughly two- 
thirds of the eastern physical capital embodied obsolete technology. With nominal wages 
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currencies seemed appropriate. However, GEMSU's promulgation of this exchange rate 
induced one of the most dramatic regional depressions in European history.  As a 
consequence of massive demand shocks, eastern product prices fell by 50 percent, on 
average, between May and August of  1990 (Akerlof et al. [1991]), while nominal wages 
and salaries remained constant.  Hence, eastern firms were squeezed between low product 
prices and high input costs, forcing the closure of  many companies that were formerly 
state owned.  Furthermore, the market value of surviving firms targeted for privatization 
by the German Trust Fund (Treuhandanstalt) declined s~bstantiall~.~ 
These events caused eastern GDP per worker to drop from a pre-GEMSU level of 
33 percent of the western figure to 22 percent by the first half of  1991. Output began to 
increase by mid- 199 1, reflecting the typical J-curve effect associated with an adjustment 
toward a market economy (Siebert 119911).  Labor productivity recovered to the pre- 
GEMSU level in late 1992. Presently, it is still less than 50 percent of the western level. 
Although significant transfers of capital and technology were undertaken during the first 
four years of transition, the rise in productivity was predominantly caused by a substantial 
decline in labor force participation.  Indeed, the industrial labor force decreased from 
3.4 million in 1989 to 1.0 million in 1993.~ 
Despite existing unemployment, eastern wages continued to increase rapidly, 
mainly because both eastern and western labor unions, as well as western employer 
3~ee  Akerlof et al. (1991) for a more detailed analysis of the macroeconomic consequences of GEMSU. 
4 See Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsberichte, various recent issues. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmassociations, insisted on accelerating the pace of wage equalization.5 Eastern wages 
increased from 33.5 percent to 40 percent of the western level within six months after 
GEMSU, and subsequently increased by 10 percentage points per year.  Presently, eastern 
nominal wages have risen to nearly 80 percent of the western level. While the prices of 
nontraded goods, like housing, were catching up with those in the West, prices of traded 
goods remained relatively stable after adjusting to the western level due to GEMSU. 
Hence, overall price inflation in the East lagged behind the pace of nominal wage 
increases, which implied growing real wages there. 
A widening gap between real wages and the marginal product of labor caused 
unemployment to rise.  Registered unemployment, however, rose from a rate of 5 percent 
in 1990 to only 15.9 percent by  1993. This official number fails to account for a 
significant number of  involuntary short-time employees and early retirees, as well as those 
participating in retraining or labor creation programs.  A more accurate estimate that takes 
these factors into account has eastern unemployment rising from a rate of  16.3 percent to 
32.1 percent during the same period (Raffelhiischen [1994]).  Even this figure may 
understate the unemployment rate by about 5 percentage points because it excludes 
workers in nonviable firms kept afloat by grants from the Treuhandanstalt. 
These macroeconomic events obviously have serious fiscal implications. First, the 
eastern region's extraordinarily large need for public goods, services, and assistance must 
be met, in order to ensure a socially tolerable transition.  This includes support for 
-  -  -  - 
Sinn and Sinn (1992) labeled this a "strategy of prohibiting employment." Eastern labor unions were, 
obviously, in favor of quick wage increases.  Western labor unions feared pressure on western wages, and 
western employer associations were afraid of competition from goods produced with cheap labor in the 
East. 
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support for nonmarket employed persons, welfare payments for the needy, etc.  In 
addition, direct infrastructure investments and private investment subsidies will be 
necessary for a successful long-term strategy of economic development. On the other 
hand, the current low productivity implies a small tax base in the East.  Although the 
eastern population exceeds 20 percent of the total, tax revenue from the East constituted 
only 6.5 percent of all tax revenue in 1992 (Council of Economic Advisors SVR [1993]). 
Financing the transition, therefore, necessitates massive transfers from the West to the 
eastern regions. 
Net transfers of $25 billion totaled 1.6 percent of the western GDP in 1990.~  As 
shown in table 1, these transfers grew to over 5 percent of western GDP in subsequent 
years.  In 1992, roughly two-thirds of these transfers were allocated for income support, 
one-fourth went toward public infrastructure investments, and the remainder was used for 
providing investment incentives for eastern fms  (Brocker and Raffelhiischen [1994]). 
These large regional transfers compelled the German government to end an era of tax and 
expenditure reductions that had led to falling public-debt-to-GDP ratios in the 1980s. 
Funding the transfers required substantial increases in both taxes and deficits. 
The various tax amendments, however, produced additional revenue of only about 
1 percent of western GDP annually during the years 1991 through 1993. The remaining 
net transfer was financed through higher public deficits. This increased the ratio of total 
public debt to western GDP from 47.6 in 1991 to 59.7 in 1993. In 1994, higher gasoline 
taxes and projected growth in revenue from value-added taxes are expected to almost 
Throughout the analysis we assume an exchange rate of DM 1.56 per dollar. 
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addition, beginning in 1995, the reintroduction of the income-tax surcharge is expected to 
boost the contribution of taxes to 3.1 percent of western GDP.  Despite the additional tax 
measures in 1994 and 1995, the ratio of debt to western GDP is projected to rise further. 
However, the rate of increase of this ratio is likely to be somewhat lower than in the past 
three years. 
The tax initiatives of the last three years imply that the burden of unification will be 
partially borne by generations alive today.  But will future generations bear a 
disproportionate share? To measure the cross-generational distribution of the burden, we 
have developed generational accounts for pre- and postunification Germany. In this 
analysis, we incorporate projections of revenue and spending until 1995, based on the 
macroeconomic and fiscal aspects of the transition process as outlined above. 
111. Methodology of Generational ~ccountin~' 
Generational accounting begins by considering the government's intertemporal 
budget constraint as shown in equation (1): 
The left-hand side of equation (1) discounts and adds together the projected 
government consumption spending for every future period s, Gs. The discounting is done 
at an assumed pretax real interest rate, r.  This present value of spending must be paid for 
7 This section contains only a brief description of the method of generational accounting.  For a more 
detailed explanation, see Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991). 
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value of  net tax payments projected to be made by generations presently alive, or 3) the 
present value of net tax payments by future generations. In equation (I), Wgt represents 
the government's net worth in the base period, t.  Let D denote the maximum age, and let 
Nt,k  stand for the present value of the net tax payments, that is, taxes net of transfer 
receipts, to be made in future years by all members of the generation born in year k.  The 
second term in equation (I), then, equals the sum of the present value of net taxes of all 
generations alive in year t.  The third term in the equation is the sum of  the present value 
of net tax payments made by generations born in year t+l and later. 
The condition of intertemporal balance can also be viewed as a financing 
constraint: A policy change that alters one of these components must be accompanied by 
a corresponding change in one or more of the other terms to "finance"  the first change. 
For example, policies that reduce projected net tax payments from living generations as a 
whole must be accompanied by either a reduction in the present value of  government 
spending or an increase in the present value of net taxes paid by future generations, or 
both.'  The term Nt,k is defined as 
In equation (2), Tsk  refers to the average net payment made in year s by members of the 
generation born in year k, while Psk stands for the number of members of the generation 
born in year k who survive until year s.  The summation begins in year t for generations 
Note that in the base period t, govenunent net worth is given and (usually) cannot be altered through a 
change in policy. 
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begins in year k.  Irrespective of the year of birth of a generation, the discounting is always 
back to year t.  Dividing the Nt,k9s  for a given generation by the population of that 
generation in the base year, Pt,k, yields the actuarially discounted per capita net payment of 
that generation, n,k. This number is the "generational account" of the generation born in 
year k. 
It should be emphasized that generational accounts encompass only taxes paid net 
of transfers received.  They do not attribute government spending for the provision of 
public goods and services (alternatively labeled as the sum of government investment and 
consumption spending)  to particular generations. Thus, generational accounts should not 
be interpreted as reflecting the full burden or benefit of government policy as a whole. 
Rather, they should be viewed as reflecting the per capita burden on particular generations 
of financing public spending as a whole.  Thus, generational accounts' calculations are 
particularly useful in evaluating the redistribution, among living and future generations, of 
net-payment burdens arising from policy changes that affect only taxes and transfers. 
Having estimated the left-hand side and the first two terms on the right-hand side 
of equation (I), the last term can be inferred as a residual.  This term represents the total 
payment in time-t present value that future generations must make if intertemporal budget 
balance is to hold.  How the burden of this required payment will actually be distributed 
among future generations is uncertain as of time t, because this distribution will be 
determined by policies adopted in the future. For illustrative purposes, however, we 
divide this residual payment equally among all future generations (those born in time t+l 
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are used to perform this calculation. The distribution is equal among future generations 
except for an adjustment for productivity growth: Each future generation makes a net 
payment that is (1  +g) times larger than that of the generation born in the preceding year, 
where g is an assumed rate of growth in labor productivity. 
It should be noted that generational accounts are prospective calculations:  They 
show the present value of future net payments per capita for all generations.  Past tax 
payments and transfer receipts of living generations are not included in the calculations. 
Thus, they represent present-value net payment burdens over the entire lifetimes only for 
newborn (those born in year t) and future generations.  A comparison of these 
generations' accounts can be used to reveal whether the current set of policies are 
generationally balanced.  The generational account for the newborn generation reflects its 
prospective net-payment burden under the assumption that it (and all older generations) 
will be treated over its entire lifetime according to the prevailing set of policies.  If the 
resulting future generations' generational account is larger than the newborn generation's 
account by more than the assumed rate of growth, the current set of policies are said to be 
imbalanced. Imbalanced fiscal policies that impose larger burdens on future generations 
are also unsustainable: If kept in place, such policies imply that an ever-growing share of 
future generations' incomes may have to be taxed away.g 
This assumes that future generations' income also grows at rate g. For detailed discussions of 
intergenerational equity, imbalance, and the sustainability of fiscal policy, see Kotlikoff (1993) and 
Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1994). See also Budget of the United States Govenunent, Analytical Perspectives, 
Fiscal Year 1995, chapter 3. 
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From equation (2) it is apparent that the calculation of future net payments NtSk  for 
presently living generations requires two projections. First, we need a gender-specific 
population projection, as described in subsection A.  Second, all future taxes paid and 
transfers received have to be estimated by age and sex.  The data description for this 
procedure is contained in subsection B.  In order to derive the net payments of all future 
generations according to equation (I),  we need to specify net government wealth and 
future government spending.  These are the subjects of subsections C and D, respectively. 
In subsection E, we discuss our choice of the interest rate for discounting future payments 
and receipts, and of the rate of growth to account for future increases in productivity and 
output.  Finally, subsection F specifies the adjustment of capital income taxes according to 
the German system of investment incentives. 
A. Population 
Starting from the eastern and western German population structures in 1992, we 
initially follow the official baseline population projections of the German Bureau of the 
Census (Statistisches Bundesamt [1993]) that take into account estimates of future fertility 
and mortality rates as well as rates of net immigration. In particular, the 1992 western 
gross fertility rate is 1.42, whereas the eastern rate is 0.96.  Assuming that these rates hold 
over the entire period, the German population would decrease from about 80 million in 
1992 to less than 20 million in 2100 and less than 5 million in 2200.  Since this is not 
realistic, we assume fertility rates to increase linearly in both regions between 2000 and 
2040, and to remain stationary at their 2040 level thereafter.  This results in a stationary 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmpopulation of 48 million from 2100 on.  We maintain the official estimates for rates of 
mortality and net immigration. 
B. Taxes and Transfers 
The aggregate taxes and transfers are obtained from official statistics on German 
national income and product accounts (Statistisches Bundesamt [1993]), government 
financial statistics (Ministry of Finance, BNIF [1993]), and the monthly statistical report of 
the German central bank (Monatsbericht der  Deutschen Bundesbank, recent issues). 
Public revenues include taxes on labor and capital income, as well as gasoline taxes, value- 
added taxes, excise taxes, insurance taxes, vehicle and other taxes, and seigniorage.and 
social-insurance  payroll taxes.''  Furthermore, we consider transfer payments of the 
various branches of  social insurance, welfare benefits, and housing, child, and maternity 
support payments. Table 2 quantifies these items in greater detail. 
Total taxes and transfers are distributed by age and sex to the regional populations 
in accordance with relative age-sex profiles applicable to each aggregate.  These payment 
profiles are obtained from microdata surveys, the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP), 
and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (EVS)." 
10 The aggregate for labor income taxes includes taxes on wages, salary payments, and imputed labor 
income taxes of the self-employed. For the self-employed, the residual represents capital income taxes. 
Capital income taxes also include corporate taxes, local business taxes on capital, and various minor taxes 
on wealth and property.  Excise taxes include those indirect taxes not included elsewhere, and comprise 
tobacco taxes and a range of special taxes on commodities. 
l1 Because of the lack of appropriate data for estimating relative profiles for indirect taxes and welfare 
benefits for eastern residents, we distribute the aggregates for these items for the entire German 
population using relative profiles of the West.  The profiles for health insurance are obtained from Henke 
and Behrens (1989). 
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According to the official statistics, government debt, including all off-budget 
authorities, amounts to $1,05 1 billion, of which 22.7 percent is attributed to the eastern 
region.I2 We correct this number by estimating government assets based on the net 
income from publicly owned enterprises, land, and other assets ($286 billion).  Thus, our 
estimate for the government's net wealth is -$766 billion, which amounts to 39.5 percent 
of GDP. 
D. Government Spending on Goods and Services 
Total government expendituies minus expenditures on transfers and subsidies to 
private fms  corresponds to public spending on net investment and provision of public 
goods and services (government consumption).13 As shown in table 2, 1992 government 
consumption spending amounted to $382.6 billion, and net investment amounted to 
$40.0 billion. 
Future government spending on goods and services is projected by assuming that 
net investment spending grows at a prespecified rate of economic growth after 1992 (see 
below).  The government consumption component takes into account changes in the 
population structure. As in Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991, 1992), we allocate 
government consumption among three age-specific components, compute per capita 
consumption in 1992, and assume that the per capita values will remain constant in future 
years except for an adjustment for economic growth.  Future aggregate consumption is 
12 Off-budget authorities include the German Unity Fund, the Debt Liquidation Fund, the Trust Fund, the 
European Recovery Program, and publicly owned postal, telecommunication, railway, and housing 
companies. 
l3  In  calculating government consumption, we subtracted transfers, subsidies, and net investment 
expenditures from the sum of total revenue plus the budget deficit (see table 2). 
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population projections. 
E. Discount and Growth Rates 
Baseline calculations use a 5 percent rate of interest for discounting all future 
14  receipts and payments.  The choice of 5 percent was made to reflect the fact that public 
receipts and expenditures, while uncertain, are not as volatile as the return on risky assets. 
Annual productivity growth is set at 1.25 percent in the baseline simulations to 
approximate the rate of productivity growth in West Germany in the past two decades. 
F. Capital Income Taxes 
Investment incentives like accelerated depreciation allowances imply a higher tax 
burden on old capital relative to new capital. This difference in treatment is reflected in 
the current market evaluation of existing capital.  Hence, current owners of capital assets 
ultimately bear the burden of the tax, due to the differential tax treatment of old and new 
capital.  Following Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) we estimate this tax burden 
to equal 18 percent of the value of western physical capital, and impose this amount as a 
one-time tax on living western generations. Our estimation makes use of recent findings 
on German capital taxation by Leibfritz (1993). 
Correspondingly, an adjustment is required for the flow of capital income taxes, 
since the current flow overstates the burden on future generations. The adjustment is 
necessary to account for the difference between the marginal tax rate on new capital and 
the observable average tax rate over both old and new capital.  In fact, our estimate of the 
14 Strictly speaking, we should use different discount rates for different taxes and transfers to account for 
their different risk characteristics (Haveman [19941).  We omitted this adjustment from our calculations, 
however, because we lack information on the riskiness of these transactions. 
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income taxes.''  Since the eastern capital stock is estimated to be largely obsolete, we 
refrain from similar explicit capital income tax adjustments for the East.  Nevertheless, 
since we assume that the flow of eastern capital income tax payments will adjust to 
western levels in the future, they include a correction for the difference between marginal 
and average tax rates, as for the West. 
V. Findings 
As outlined earlier, unification was initiated with the extension of the social 
insurance and welfare programs to cover eastern residents, and is being financed through a 
combination of tax increases and higher public deficits. Because of their lower incomes, 
however, eastern residents' per capita taxes and transfers are currently lower than in the 
West.  They will approximate western levels only as eastern per capita income and 
consumption expenditures approach those of  western residents. When this will occur 
depends upon the length of  the transition period, which is uncertain.  To fix a reference 
point, our baseline simulations assume that the transition will be completed by  the year 
2010.16  During the transition, eastern tax payments and transfer receipts are assumed to 
rise uniformly, so that equality with western per capita values is achieved in the year 2010. 
Since the income tax surcharge is supposed to be eliminated upon completion of the 
transition, the surcharge is removed after the year 2010 in the baseline simulations. 
15 This adjustment seems large but is the result of  the rather high rates of marginal capital income 
taxation in Germany, recently estimated to be over 50 percent. 
l6 Briicker and Raffelhiischen (1993) simulate an overlapping generations model for estimating the time 
required for the catching-up process to be completed. Our choice of the year 2010 is in line with their 
findings. 
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Tables 3a and 3b show the components of generational accounts as of  1992 for 
selected male and female German generations. The first item to note is that the "net 
payment" column shows a significant life-cycle pattern:  Younger generations make 
positive net payments to the government over their remaining lifetimes, while older 
generations are net recipients. Under the baseline scenario, a 30-year-old male is expected 
to pay over $300,000 to the government in present value.  A similarly aged female will pay 
about $130,000. This is because 30-year-olds currently pay high amounts of labor, 
payroll, value added, and excise taxes, but will not receive much in social insurance and 
other transfers for a number of years in the future.  On the other hand, a 65-year-old male 
will receive about $1 50,000 from the government, and a female of the same age $90,000, 
because of their low present values of tax payments but high present values of transfer 
receipts, especially from social insurance. 
Newborn male generations of 1992 will pay an estimated $183,000 in present 
value over their entire lifetimes. The growth-adjusted value of this payment for future 
male generations is $224,000, which is about 22 percent larger. The corresponding 
figures for newborn and future female generations are $94,300 and $1 11,000.'~  This 22 
percent differential implies that if our baseline representation of German fiscal policy is 
correct, future German generations will have to hand over to the government net taxes 
that are 22 percent larger, on average and after adjusting for growth, than the net 
payments that current newborns are estimated to make if their fiscal treatment is 
l7 The calculations assume that the ratio between the net payments of male and  female generations born in 
the future is the same as that between the net payments of newborn male and  female generations. 
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despite the income tax surcharge, higher gasoline taxes, and other recent revenue- 
increasing measures. 
Table 4 reports the differential between newborn and future generations' net 
payments for alternative interest rate (3, 5, and 7 percent)  and growth rate (0.75, 1.25, 
and 1.75 percent) combinations. The differentials range from 6 percent to 23 percent. 
Thus, the imbalance resulting from postunification fiscal policy in Germany is sustained for 
a wide range of growth and discount rates. 
B. Isolating the Impact of Unification 
Table 5 indicates net payments for the western residents alone under baseline 
assumptions, with and without taxes for unification. Compared to the figures in tables 3a 
and 3b, western net payments of unification-related taxes are generally higher for younger 
generations (those whose net payments are positive). This is because similarly aged 
eastern generations pay less per capita during the transition. Western male generations 65 
and older, however, receive relatively more than the overall German average.  Again, this 
occurs because older eastern generations receive lower per capita transfers during the 
transition. The same is not true for older western women. 
To isolate the burden of unification on western residents, we calculated 
hypothetical generational accounts for the West under a "no unification" scenario, where 
no unification-related tax increases are imposed on western residents, and government 
l8 Note that our baseline assumes that the transition will be completed by 2010. Prolonging the period of 
transition would imply that only eastern living generations' tax and transfer payments would grow more 
slowly, and the net impact on the imbalance could go either way.  Ow calculations indicate that if the 
transition is assumed to end in 2020 or 2030 (instead of 2010), the imbalance would be 32.4 or 
40.2 percent, respectively (instead of  22.4 percent). 
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taxes" columns in table 5 show the net payment burdens for western residents for this 
case.  Table 5 also shows the differences in net payments of western residents with and 
without taxes.  Thus, these columns indicate the changes in western net payments due to 
unification.  Western residents of all ages will share in the burden of unification, but the 
burdens on those age 55 or less are especially large.  For example, 25-year-old men and 
women in the West will contribute an estimated $30,000 and $20,000, respectively, 
toward the costs of unification. Generally, working-age and younger generations (those 
who will soon enter the workforce) are expected to contribute significantly more than 
those retired or close to retirement. 
Table 6 shows the components of the burden on western residents due to various 
tax amendments that were adopted for funding German unification.19 In particular, it 
reflects the additional burdens resulting from the income tax surcharge that was in place 
until July 1992 and will be reintroduced in 1995 (shown under "labor income taxes" and 
"capital income taxes").  The increases in gasoline taxes in 199  1, in tobacco taxes in 1992, 
and in insurance taxes in 1991, 1993, and 1995 are responsible for the large increases in 
present value burdens (shown under "excise taxes").  Furthermore, we included the 1993 
change in the VAT and the 1991 and 1994 increases in payroll taxes for unemployment 
insurance and social security (shown under "social  insurance^").^'  Table 6 indicates that 
l9 See Raffelhiischen (1994) for a detailed discussion. 
20 Changes in burdens due to  tax amendments unrelated to unification -- that is, the gasoline tax increase 
in 1994 and the additional income tax allowances in 1993 -- are not reflected in table 6. 
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female western generations.21 
C. Evaluating the Impact of the Income Tax Surcharge 
Although the income tax surcharge is expected to be introduced in 1995 and to last 
as long as is "deemed necessary" for facilitating the process of adjustment, a range of 
possibilities exists with regard to its adoption and longevity.  We explore the 
consequences of the income tax surcharge by examining the consequences of  1) not 
enforcing the surcharge at all, 2) adopting the surcharge in 1995 and eliminating it 
"prematurely"  in the year 2000 and 3) adopting and maintaining the surcharge indefinitely. 
In each case the transition process is assumed to last until 2010. 
Table 7 shows the changes in net payment burdens from the three experiments, 
relative to the baseline.  Not adopting the surcharge reduces net payment burdens on 
30-year-old males by about $5,400 and on 30-year-old females by $2,200.  The burdens 
on future generations rise, as a result of this policy, by $10,200 for males and $5,000 for 
females, implying a net payment burden that is 28 percent larger than that of newborn 
generations. The results from ending the surcharge prematurely in the year 2000 are 
qualitatively similar.  Adopting and permanently maintaining the surcharge, however, 
imposes losses on living generations amounting, for example, to $3,200 for 30-year-old 
males and $1,300 for 30-year-old females.  Future male generations' net payments decline 
by $9,200 and female generations' net payments fall by $4,500.  This policy would reduce 
21 The fact that most of the burden of unification on western generations arises from indirect taxes rather 
than income taxes may reduce the progressivity of the German tax system. However, intragenerational 
distribution issues are not the subject of this paper. 
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baseline scenario) from 22 percent to 14 percent. 
Introducing and forever maintaining the income tax surcharge only partially 
reduces the imbalance. Fully eliminating the imbalance will require a permanent 
9.3 percent increase in income taxes.  Increasing income taxes is, of course, not the only 
means of removing the imbalance.  A 10.5 percent permanent increase in indirect taxes 
(VAT and excise taxes) or, alternatively, a lowering of social security benefits by  10.4 
percent would also restore a balanced fiscal policy.  Another method of restoring balance 
would be to permanently reduce government spending on goods and services by 6.0 
percent. 
The earlier description of methodology mentioned the usefulness of generational 
accounting for evaluating the impact on living generations of policies that involve changes 
in taxes and transfers alone.  Table 8 shows the generational distribution of net payment 
burdens from three of the policies described earlier that equalize the growth-adjusted net 
payments of newborn and future generations. The policy of increasing income taxes, for 
example, imposes large burdens on the currently young and working-age male 
generations, relatively moderate burdens on younger female generations, and very small 
burdens on all generations aged 60 or more.  The table shows that, compared to income 
taxes, higher indirect taxes distribute the burden with relative equality among younger 
male and female generations.  Also, under indirect taxation, older generations' burdens 
would be somewhat larger than under income taxation. In contrast, a policy of reducing 
social security benefits would mainly affect older generations whose burdens rise 
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future male and female generations' net payment burdens is the largest under this policy. 
It should be noted that under the three policies involving tax increases or benefit 
reductions, the time profile of  annual revenue increases will be different.  Because the time 
path of total government expenditures is kept the same in each case, the pattern of future 
annual deficits will be different for the three policies.  Hence, restoring generational 
balance in fiscal policy can be consistent with a different time profile of budget deficits. 
Focusing on deficits alone may, therefore, be a poor and perhaps a misleading method for 
gauging the stance of German fiscal policy (as noted by Kotlikoff [1993]). 
VI. Comparison of Germany and the United States 
Table 9 shows broad budgetary aggregates for the United States and Germany as a 
percentage of their respective GDPs.  It is apparent that, relative to the size of the 
economy, the German government's budget was considerably larger in 1992 than that of 
the United States on both the revenue and outlay sides. As a fraction of GDP, for 
example, the sum of the major categories of taxes stood about 14 percentage points 
higher, and transfer expenditures relative to GDP were 6 percentage points larger, in 
Germany compared to the United States in the same year. 
Table 10 shows current and projected population shares of young, working-age, 
and elderly groups for Germany and the United States. The table indicates that the 
proportion of  the elderly in Germany has already reached the level that is projected to 
occur in the United States in the year 2015 and later.  Thus, in terms of population aging, 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmGermany is about 20 years ahead of the United States. Until the year 2025, a larger 
proportion of Germans than of Americans will be of working age.  Early in the next 
century, however, the share of the elderly in Germany is projected to rise significantly, 
while that of working-age individuals is expected to decline. Hence, the burden on 
German workers of supporting the elderly is expected to increase over the next several 
decades.  A similar, though less pronounced, trend is evident for the United States. In 
both countries, the share of  the youngest individuals -- participants in future labor forces -- 
declines over time. 
An aging population, high pension, social security, and health-care benefit levels, 
and a declining share of working-age and younger generations, all contribute toward 
producing generationally imbalanced fiscal policies.  Table 11 shows generational accounts 
for the United States and Germany for the year 1992. The columns for Germany are the 
same as the net payment columns in tables 3a and 3b.  Baseline generational accounts for 
the United States are shown in columns 3 and 4 in table 11. These are computed using 
baseline revenue and spending projections as described in the Budget of the United States 
Government, Fiscal Year 1995.  To maintain comparability with the German accounts, a 
discount rate of 5 percent and a growth rate of  1.25 percent are used in the  calculation^.^^ 
The accounts for both countries indicate imbalanced fiscal policies, but they differ in 
several respects. 
First, younger male and female German generations are slated to pay about one- 
third more in present value net taxes than do similarly aged generations in the United 
States.  Second, recently retired male generations in Germany receive much more by way 
22 See Budget of the United States Government, Analytical Perspectives,  Fiscal Year 1995, chapter 3. 
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generations and the over-75 male generations in the United States receive more in present 
value, on net, than do their German counterparts.  Third, per capita net payment burdens 
on future American and German generations are roughly similar for both males and 
females.  Fourth, the degree of policy imbalance is much more severe in the United States 
than in Germany.  This result can be explained by noting that direct government spending 
in the two countries is roughly similar (see table 9), but current policies tax living 
generations in the United States to a much lesser extent than is the case in Germany.  In 
addition, net payment burdens, especially of females and very old male generations, are 
much higher in the United States than in Germany, primarily because of the projected 
rapid increase in U.S. public health insurance outlays.  Thus, U.S. fiscal policy favors 
living generations, especially older ones, far more than German fiscal policy does. 
A rapid increase in German health-care outlays is unlikely to occur because such 
outlays are strictly regulated in Germany.  As mentioned earlier, current U.S. policy 
projections incorporate a high growth rate for federal health insurance outlays.23 
However, if some of  the recent proposals for reforming the U.S. health-care system are 
adopted, growth in public health-care outlays may be significantly reduced.  The precise 
amount and timing of  health-care spending reductions is uncertain.  However, for 
23 Until the year 2005, annual aggregates for Medicare were taken from projections provided by  the 
United States Office of Management and Budget.  Between the years 2005 and 2030, the growth rates for 
Medicare are based on projections made by the United States Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA).  In these projections, Medicare grows between 3 and 4 percentage points faster than the baseline 
rate of future productivity growth. For Medicaid, HCFA's growth rate projections are used from 1993 on. 
Growth in Medicaid is especially high in the near term (about 9 percentage points faster than the assumed 
rate of future productivity growth).  Between the years 2005 and 2030, this expenditure grows by between 
1  and 3 percentage points faster than productivity. After 2030, the growth rates of both of these 
expenditures are set equal to the rate of productivity growth. 
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growth in per capita federal health-care outlays is stabilized, beginning in 1994, to match 
the rate of population plus productivity growth.  As the last two columns in table 1  1 show, 
the imbalance in the United States under such a policy (1  6.3 percent) would be roughly 
similar to the baseline German level.  Compared to the baseline, this policy reduces the 
U.S. imbalance significantly because it increases the net payments of all living generations 
and reduces the size of the present-value spending that must be financed through net 
payments of future generations. Notwithstanding a stabilization of U.S.  health-care 
outlays, elderly females and very old males still receive larger benefits per capita than do 
their German counterparts, and the'net payments of younger generations remain lower 
than those of similarly aged German generations. 
VII. Conclusion 
The passage of the last four years has made the economic prospects facing 
postunification Germany much clearer. This paper focuses on prevailing German fiscal 
policies, particularly on the fiscal effects of unification for current and future generations. 
Current (unified) German fiscal policy contains an imbalance in that future generations will 
be required to make net payments that are, on average and after adjusting for growth, 
22.4 percent larger than those of current newborns, if the latter continue to be treated as 
they are under current policies.  Much of the burden of unification is likely to be borne by 
young and working-age West German males.  This burden can be traced to the recent 
hikes in indirect taxes and to the imminent reintroduction of the income tax surcharge in 
1995.  If  the surcharge is maintained beyond the completion of the transition period early 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmin the next century, the overall imbalance in German fiscal policy will be substantially 
lower, although it will not be eliminated entirely. The imbalance can be eliminated 
through alternative combinations of higher taxes and spending cuts, although the precise 
incidence of additional burdens among living generations can be very different for different 
combinations of policies. 
Under current policy projections, the imbalance in German fiscal policy is much 
smaller than the imbalance in the United States because the net payment burdens on 
younger living generations are considerably higher in ~erman~.~~  Under a policy of 
stabilizing U.S. public spending on health care, however, the imbalances in the two 
countries' fiscal policies are similar. Finally, the influence of fiscal policy on the economy 
may be better gauged by its generation-specific incidence than by focusing on the 
government's annual budget deficits, since different policies that produce a generational 
balance can be associated with a different time profile of deficits. 
"  Since the generational accounting exercise is based on current policies and current projections of 
budgetav aggregates, the negative net payments for the elderly in the United States are affected by the 
currently high rate of  growth projected for Medicare and Medicaid.  Fiscal policies will, obviously, be 
altered in the future.  Therefore, generational accounting should be viewed as a projection based on 
current policies, not as a forecast that current policies will remain in place indefinitely. 
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Total 
Percent of Western GDP 
Additional Public Receipts 
Federal, State, and Local 
Social Insurance 
Total 
Percent of Western GDP 
Public Debt  (*) 
Total 
Percent of Western GDP 
Percent of Total GDP 
Table 1:  West-East Transfer, Additional Public Receipts, 
and Public Debt in Transition (billions  of dollars) 
(*) without publicly owned postal, telecommunication,  and railway companies 
Source: Council of Economic Advisors, SVR (1991, 1992, 1993), 
Ministry of Finance, BMF  (1991a, 1991b, 1992, 1993), and 
authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 2:  Public Receipts and Expenditures in Germany in 1992 
(billions  of dollars) 
Receipts  Expenditures 
Labor Income Taxes 
Capital Income Taxes 
Seigniorage 

























Total  920.1  920.3 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt  (1993),  Ministry of Finance BMF  (1993), 
and Monatsbericht der Deutschen Bundesbank, recent issues. 
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Age in 1992  Payment 
Future 
Generat  ions  224.0 
Percentage 
Difference  22.4 
Table 3a: Adjustment and Income Tax Surcharge Removed in 2010 (Baseline) 
The Composition of Male Generational Accounts  (r=  .05, g= .0125 ) 
Present Values of Receipts and Payments 
(thousands of dollars) 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Labor  Capital  Excise  Social  Social  General  Youth & 
Income  Income  Seign-  VAT  Taxes  Insur-  Security  HI  UI  Welfare Housing  Mater- 
Taxes  Taxes  iorage  a.0.  ances  and A1  nity 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 3b: ~djustment  and Income Tax Surcharge Removed in 2010 (Baseline) 
The Composition of Female Generational Accounts (r=  .05, g= .0125 ) 
Present Values of Receipts and Payments 
(thousands  of dollars) 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Labor  Capital  Excise  Social  Social  General  Youth & 
Generation's  Net  Income  Income  Seign-  VAT  Taxes  Insur-  Security  HI  UI  Welfare Houming  Mater- 
Age in 1992  Payment  Taxes  Taxes  iorage  a.  ances  and A1  nity 
Future 
Generations  111.0 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmclevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 5:  The Burden of Unification on Western Residents  (r= .05,  g= .0125 ) 
Present Values of Receipts and Payments 
(thousands of dollars) 
Male Net Payments  Female Net  Payments 
Without  With  Burden  Percent  Without  With  Burden on  Percent 
Taxes  Taxes  on Males  increasea  Taxes  Taxes  Females  increasea 
Generation's 
Age in 1992 
Future 
Generations  237.0  147.8  -89  -2 
a.  Percent Increase numbers refer to increases in burden or decreases in receipts relative to the 
levels without taxes. 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
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Age in 1992 
Table 6:  Sources of the Burden of Unification on Western Residents  (r=  .05,  g= -0125  ) 
Present Values of Receipts and Payments 
(thousands  of dollars) 
Males  Females 
Changes  Changes 
in Net  Changes in Tax Payments  in Net  Changes in Tax Payments 
Payment  Payment 
Future 
Generations  -89.2 
Labor  Capital  Excise  Social 
Income  Income  VAT  Taxes  Insur- 
Taxes  Taxes  a.0.  ances 
Labor  Capital  Excise  Social 
Income  Income  VAT  Taxes  Insur- 
Taxes  Taxes  a.0.  ances 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
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Age in 1992 
Future 
Generations 
Table 7:  Changes in Accounts from Alternative Income Tax Surcharge Policies 
Present Values of Receipts and Payments 
(thousands of dollars) 
Income Tax Surcharge 
Not Enforced in 1995  Ends in Year 2000  Lasts Forever 




























































Source: Authorsr calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 8:  Changes in Accounts from Alternative Policies to Restore Generational Balance 
Present Values of Receipts and Payments 
(thousands  of dollars) 
Increase  Increase 
Generation's  Income Taxes  Indirect Taxes 
Age in 1992 
Future 
Generations  - 
Males  Females  Males  Females 
Reduce Social Security 
Benefits 
Males  Females 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 9:  Comparative Fiscal Ratios for the United States and Germany, 1992 
United States  Germany 
30.7  44.4 
Total OU~~~~S/GDP~  35.4  48.0 
Direct Spending/~~P~  18.7  21.8 
Direct Spending 
Per Capita ($) 
a.  Direct taxes, indirect taxes, and social insurance contributions 
b.  Purchases on current account 
c.  Government consumption plus investment 
d.  Includes Social Security benefits, excludes subsidies 
Source: OECD and Statistischee  Bundeeamt (1993). 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 10: Population Distributions by Selected Age Groups 
for Germany and the United States 




Sources: United States: Social Security Administration. 
Germany: German Bureau of the Census (Statistisches 
Bundesamt[l9941)  and authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 11: Net  Payment Burdens in the United States and Germany, 1992 
(present  values in thousands of dollars) 
Germany  United States 
(baseline  ) 
United States 
(Health-Care  Stabi- 
lized after 1994) 
Males  Females  Males  Females  Males  Female 
Future 
Generations  224.0 
Percentage 
Difference  22.4 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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